The proliferation of malware is a serious threat to computer 
Introduction
Malware refers to a broad class of malicious software that threatens computer and information systems and networks. Such software may modify, destroy or steal data, may obtain unauthorized access to confidential information and exploit vulnerabilities in applications. Authors of malware often obfuscate the executable components so as to make the malware more difficult to identify. In [2] , the authors identify four ways in which this is commonly done. These are: the insertion of dead code that does not change the original code in any way, interchanging the uses of registers, replacing one sequence of instructions with an equivalent one, and permuting instruction sequences in the code without changing the code behaviour. In this paper, we do not assume that the malware under analysis has been deobfuscated. However, we do assume that the malware we consider has been unpacked, that is, it has not been compressed or encrypted in any way.
In combatting malware, the major approach has been to establish links between the software in order to classify it into categories and hence speed up the development of a response based on an understanding of the intent of a class of malware. Many organizations have accumulated zoos of malware obtained over many years and these have generally been examined in a relatively slow, often manual process to determine the intent of the code. The malware analyzed in the current paper is from CA's VET zoo (www.ca.com); thus it has been pre-classified using generally acceptable mechanical means. Such a classification relies on the ability to determine the significant feature or features which establish the true identification of the malware. This significant feature is referred to as 'the signature'. Many research papers have been directed at determining this signature [8] , [10] . The implication is that there is some unique factor which defines a piece of code. While this may be the case for a specific sample, given the many obfuscation techniques, it is unlikely to be true for a general family; there may be several features of a piece of code which together indicate its purpose, but which separately do not definitively reveal this information.
"According to Symantec and Microsoft, typically only a few hundred families appear in any half-year period. This places the number of variants in an average family in the thousands per half-year period. The Microsoft data shows that the top seven families account for more than 50 per cent of all variants found. The top 25 families account for over 75 per cent." [14] Thus it is highly likely that any new malware is a variation of some previous program.
For many years, malware analysis has been done with file management systems in which the malware is stored as a file and files are organized in a directory tree. A new piece of malware was then matched against these files. In order to perform the work presented in this paper efficiently, we moved to a database environment which provided us with an integrated management interface, a standard format for binaries and better and faster interoperability with other tools and databases. We use Ida2sql (www.dkbza.org), a Python module which exports disassembly information from our disassembly tool IDA into the SQL schema [1] . However, as we explain in Section 3, we added a number of features in order to make our analysis more effective.
IDA (www.hex-rays.com/idapro/ ), and other disassembly tools, segment code being analyzed into what are generally called 'functions'. These functions are not necessarily self-contained software routines which perform a certain task as defined by a programmer. An IDA function is sim-ply an independent piece of code identified as such by IDA. We discuss this further in Section 3.
In this paper, our aim is to use the functions, as determined by IDA, as the basis of a classification system for malware. We use two aspects of these functions: one is the length of the function as measured by the number of bytes of code in it; the other is the frequency with which function lengths occur within any particular sample of malware. These values are easy to obtain as output from IDA for any unpacked input. We gather this data for seven families of Trojans, encompassing 721 files in all. Our results indicate that both function features are significant in identifying the family to which a piece of malware belongs; the frequency values are slightly more significant than the function lengths with respect to accuracy while the reverse is true with respect to the rate of true positives.
In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature in this area. In Section 3, we detail our analytical approach and in Section 4 describe the experimental set-up. Sections 5 and 6 present the two tests, the first based on function frequency and the second on function length. Section 7 analyzes and compares the results of the two tests. We conclude in Section 8.
Related Work
In recent years, many researchers have turned their attention to the analysis and classification of malware using many different approaches. In all the literature cited here, malware samples are assumed to be unpacked unless otherwise mentioned.
Gheorghescu [4] uses basic blocks of code in the malware, which are defined as 'a continuous sequence of instructions that contains no jumps or jump target' and on average contain 12-14 bytes of data. These blocks are used to form a control flow graph. The (string edit) distance between two basic blocks is defined to be the number of bytes in which the blocks differ. Thus malware is compared using the edit distance. Some improvements for producing the data are also mentioned. Results are presented on 4000 samples of Win32 malware. An important contribution of this paper is that the author demonstrates that it is possible to implement an automated real-time system to perform this analysis on a desktop machine.
Kapoor and Spurlock [5] argue that binary code comparison of the malware itself is not satisfactory because it is error prone, can easily be affected by the injection of junk code and because code comparison algorithms are expensive with poor time complexity. They argue that comparing malware on the basis of functionality is more effective because it is really the behaviour of the code that determines what it is. These authors assign weightings to code functions depending on the complexity of the function, hypothesizing that the more complex the function, the more likely it is to define the code behaviour. A function tree is then constructed based on the control flow graph of the system, and used to eliminate 'uninteresting' code. They then convert the tree description of a malware sample to a vector and compare vectors to determine similarity of malware. The major drawback of this method is the intensive preprocessing which must be done in determining the weight to assign to each function.
Several authors have used sequences of system calls, API calls and function calls of malware in order to model its behaviour. Peisert et al. [9] use sequences of function calls to represent program behaviour. Sathyanarayan et al. [10] use static analysis to extract API calls from known malware in order to construct a signature for an entire class. The API calls of an unclassified sample of malware can then be compared with the 'signature' API calls for a family to determine if the sample belongs in the family or not. In our opinion, obfuscation of API calls could affect the accuracy of their results. Sathyanarayan et al. use IDA to assist in API extraction. They provide outcomes of their tests on eight families with 126 samples in total. API Calls are also used by [16] to compare polymorphic malware.
Christodorescu et al. [3] take a different approach, arguing that it is the behaviour of malware that should be used to classify it. Viewing the malware as a black box, they focus on its interaction with the operating system, therefore using system calls as the building blocks of their technique. They compare these with system calls of non-malicious code in order to trim the resulting graph of dependencies between calls. Results are presented based on an analysis of 16 pieces of known malware. These methods are intensive as behavioral information for each piece of malware has to be collected and a graph is then constructed for it.
Most classification approaches assume that the malware is unpacked. Unpacking malware is a difficult and slow process which needs techniques quite different from those used for classification. Many research groups focus solely on the unpacking problem. Thus we, along with most classification researchers, assume that we are working with malware which is not packed.
In the following section, we present our approach to the classification problem based on a data set of seven families of Trojans. On the positive side, our methods are simpler and faster than those discussed above and scale well to large size samples, unlike those methods based on tree or graph comparisons. On the negative side, using function size and frequency appears to give a correct classification in only about 80% of cases and so these features must be used with others for a better determination.
Sample Preparation
Our general approach to the classification problem is to extract a broad set of features from each malware sample that can be passed to an automated classification system. The process is to first unpack the malware samples, then disassemble them using IDA, export the disassembly analysis to a database, and then extract a feature vector. Figure 1 shows the architecture of our classification system. In the experiment described in this paper the feature extraction only extends to function length information.
Figure 1. Malware Classification System based on Ida2DB
It is necessary to unpack the malware samples before analysing them with our system. We used the free software program named VMUnpacker v1.3, to unpack most of our samples in this experiment. In a few cases we unpacked the samples using manual processes.
We use IDA Pro V5.1 as our disassembly tool. Our system uses Ida2sql, a Python module, to export the disassembly information from IDA into an SQL database which we call Ida2DB. The schema for Ida2DB is adapted from a schema in Sabre-Security's BinNavi product. We modified the schema to support Microsoft SQL Server DBMS, and we changed the database structure to use a fixed number of tables in which to store binaries. We also added some other disassembly information, such as strings extracted from executables. The next step in the process is to generate components of a feature vector by analysing the database from different perspectives. Our aim is to find features that are simple and inexpensive to extract but that can be used to distinguish between different families. For the purpose of this experiment, we programmed database functions and stored procedures to fetch function length information from the database.
Our architecture allows us to effectively extract large amounts of disassembly information and obtain a wide range of features of a malware sample in a swift and simple way.
Experimental Set-up
In some initial experiments we extracted function length information from our Ida2sql database. For each sample we constructed a list containing the length (in bytes) for all the functions. We then sorted the list from the shortest length function to the longest, and graphed it. We call this the function length pattern. Figure 2 gives three samples from the Robzips family.
With samples from within the same malware family, we noticed that although the number of functions and their lengths varied, the shape of the function length pattern looked similar. This motivated us to investigate whether The unpacking process may not produce the original binary. In addition, when IDA disassembles unpacked malware, it identifies functions according to its own autoanalysis procedure [11] . The functions finally extracted may be different from those returned by the malware programmer. Although it is difficult to be precise in regard to exactly what is meant by a function in the context of this experiment, we are nevertheless using a reliable and repeatable process.
In this experiment, function length is defined to be the number of bytes in the function as defined by IDA. The function length pattern vectors are the raw input given to our experiments. An example function length vector, taken from the Beovens family, is (24, 38, 46, 52, 118, 122, 124, 140, 204, 650, 694, 1380). (All vectors and sets referred to in this paper are ordered.) Each component in this vector represents the length of a function in the example. There are 12 functions in the sample, and the function lengths are 24, 38, 46, . . . , 1380 respectively; the maximum function length is 1380.
In our experiment we used 721 files from 7 families of Trojans. Table 1 lists the families we looked at and the number of samples from each family. The raw function length vectors are of different sizes so are not directly comparable. We tried two different approaches to creating vectors of standardized size. The first was to count the frequency of functions of different lengths (described in Section 5), the other was to standardize the function length vectors to be of the same size and scale so that the patterns could be compared (described in Section 6).
Figure 3. Overview of our experimental Process
In order to determine whether function length information can be used in classification, we choose, in each test and for each family, a target vector, which we call a 'centroid' and determine how close each sample is to this centroid. For a good choice of the centroid, we expect samples in the family to be close in a carefully defined statistical way, and we expect samples not in the family to be far.
We used k-fold cross validation in each test [6] . For each family we randomly partitioned the vectors into 5 subsets of approximately equal size. We used one subset as the test set, and combined the other 4 subsets as the training set. We used the training set to calibrate the test and validated the effectiveness of the centroids against the test set. This was repeated 5 times, so that each vector was used as a test sample.
Our classification used an adaptation of the technique described by [10] . For each training set we calculated a centroid vector. We used statistical methods to determine whether a test vector was sufficiently close to the centroid vector to be classified as belonging to that family.
Function Length Frequency Test
We first introduce some standard notation which is referred to throughout this section and the next. Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N } represent a general population of N function length vectors. P * represents the set of all the standardized vectors. We use F for a set of vectors from a specific family having n samples. For any particular function vector P k with m k elements, we write P k = (p k1 , p k2 , ..., p kmk ) and refer to m k as the size of the function length vector.
In both the tests of Sections 5 and 6, we use the k-fold cross validation method discussed in Section 4, applying it five times. In both cases, T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T r } ⊂ F represents a training set chosen from the family F. Then Q = F − T = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q n−r } is used as a test set. Each entry T i in the training set is represented by the vector , t i2 , . . . , t im ), and each entry Q i in the test set is represented by a vector Q i = (q i1 , q i2 , . . . , q im ).
Data Processing
The function length frequency test is based on counting the number of functions in different length ranges. We divide the function length scale into intervals, which we call bins, and for each sample count the frequency of functions occurring in each bin. Due to the order of magnitude differences between function lengths, we increase the range covered by our bins exponentially. For example, we might count the number of functions of lengths between 1 and e bytes, the number between e and e 2 bytes, etc. In our experiment, we choosem = 50 as the number of bins. This now allows us to associate a new vector of size 50 with each function length vector in the population as described below. In introducing a factor to include the height variations, we map an exponential function over the entire spectrum of the dataset, from heights 1 to M , the maximum function length across the complete dataset. Assuming that this exponential function is given by y = ae kx where y(0) = 1 and y(m) = M , it follows that a = 1, k = ln M/m, and so y = e lnM m x . Thus, for any P k from the population, the entry in the standardized form P * k of P k of size 50 is:
for j = 1 . . .m.
Statistical Test
We assume that the vectors of the entire population have been standardized as described in Section 5.1. For each family F we choose 80% as a training set from which we compute a single 'centroid' vector to use in comparing against the entire dataset as a means of classification. We obtain this centroid vector A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , am) by computing each term as follows:
For each family, this process is repeated five times, each time using a different 80% of the family and in such a way that each vector appears in exactly one test set. For each training set, the complement within the family is used as the test set. The Chi-square test is applied as a test for Goodness of Fit of the centroid vector and vectors in the training set [12] . For each T i = (t i1 , t i2 , . . . , t im ) in the training set, a Chi-square vector χ 2 = (χ
Finally, χ 2 is compared against a threshold value from a standard Chi-square distribution table [12] . A significance level of 0.05 is selected, which means that 95% of the time we expect χ 2 to be less than or equal to . For each T i , let
For each T i , the value λ i defined by:
represents the proportion of components of T i which fall within the threshold . Thus
represents the proportion of elements of the training set which fall within the threshold. We now apply this test to the set of standardized vectors from the entire dataset, excluding those used in the training set. Let T * be the set of adjusted vectors from T as in Equation (1). Let X now be any vector from the set P * − T * . We compare X with A by applying Equations (3) and (4) to produce λ X as in Equation (5).
Let P (F, A) represent the set of vectors which were classified by our test as belonging to the family. It is constructed as follows :
We repeat this process for all five training sets of each family. Table 2 in the next subsection summarizes the classification accuracy of our tests. Table 2 .
Test Result

Function Length Frequency Results
For each family F in Table 2 , TP represents the true positives, that is the number of samples belonging to the family which our test correctly classified. Formally, TP = |Q∩P (F, A)| represents the number of samples in Q which were placed in P (F, A) for any of the centroid vectors A. TN represents the true negatives, that is the number of samples not in F which were not placed in P (F, A) for all five centroid vectors A. Similarly, FP represents the false positives, the number of samples not in F which were placed in P (F, A) by any centroid A, while FN represents the false negatives, the number of samples in Q which were not placed in P (F, A) by some centroid A. The total number of positives, P = TP + FN , is the set of elements of Q repeated five times, one for each centroid, while the total number of negatives, N = TN + FP , is the set of elements not in F, again, repeated five times. Finally, the True Positive and False Positive rates are generated over the whole population and all five tests (per family) as in Equation (8) .
The Accuracy in Equation (8) measures how closely the test determines true containment, or not, in the family. We thus expect it to be close to 1. While this is the case in Table 2 , the average True Positive rate is a little disappointing. This motivated us to continue to the test described in Section 6.
Function Length Pattern Test
The graphs of function lengths of malware samples described in Section 4 appear to have some similarities within families and differences across families. In this section, we again use function length as a distinguisher, but in a different way from the approach in Section 5. In this test we directly use the pattern made by the function length. We use two steps in order to prepare the data. First, we standardize the vector size across the entire dataset by resizing the function length vector along the x-axis by a rational factor. Each term in the new vector is a weighted average of corresponding terms in the old vector. In the second step, we retain the shape of the pattern of function lengths by standardizing along the y-axis family by family. We do this by multiplying each component of the old vector by a formula derived by averaging the first component (the shortest function length) and last component (the longest function length). The standardization of vector size must be made across the whole database as we need to compare all vectors pairwise; the standardization of height is done family by family as this appears to be a significant identifier.
Data Processing
Step 1: standardize vectors in the complete dataset
We first obtain the average size over all vectors in the datasetm = m1+m2+...+mN N . Then for each arbitrary P K we standardize it by using the continuous function f defined over the domain [0, m k ) given by:
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We create the new vectorP k of lengthm, by dividing the domain of f intom equal sections and calculating the mean value of f (x) over each section of the domain. That is,
where C = mk m and j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}. Each point in the function length vector P k is given equal representation in the resized vector P k = (p k1 ,p k2 , ...,p kmk ).
Step 2: standardize pattern height family by family
We choose a training set T from a family F (refer to Section 5 for the notation). LetP k ∈ T ⊂ F. We average over the first component and then over the last component in each vector P k ∈ T. Let v 1 = 
At this point, all vectors in the population have been standardized for size and each family has been standardized for pattern.
Statistical Test
For each family we choose an 80% subset as a training set from which we compute a single centroid vector to use in comparing against the entire dataset as a means of classification. We assume that all vectors have been standardized as in Section 6.1. We again run this test five times, each time using a different 80% portion of the family. For each test and each family, we calculate v 1 and vm using the method above. Using Equation (2) of Section 5.2, we compute the centroid vector A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , am).
In [15] the author states that for large samples, the assumption of the parent population being normally distributed is not needed for the Student t-test. Assuming the whole dataset has a t-distribution, we therefore use the Student t-test to compare the centroid vector with a sample vector. The standard deviation vector S = (s 1 , s 1 , . . . , sm) is calculated by:
For each T i in the training set and for each component t ij we calculate the t-value to test whether the component's value is consistent with belonging to the family. For each T i , we get τ i = (τ i1 , τ i2 , . . . , τ im ) using the following formula:
We choose a confidence level α = 0.05 which means we expect that 95% of the values are within standard deviation of the centroid vector. Thus if τ ij ≤ , this component is consistent with belonging to the family. In our experiment, the number of samples in each family is different, so we adjust according to the size of each family. For each T i , let
Then we get the degree of membership λ i from Equation (5) and the threshold λ for the family from Equation (6). We thus acquire both the centroid vector A and a threshold λ for each family. Based on these, we calculate the true positive and false positive rates as in Equation (8) . Table 3 .
Function Length Pattern Results
The True Positive rate achieved in this test is much higher than that in the previous test while the level of Accuracy was retained.
Discussion
The results of both tests show the true positive rate to be much higher than the false positive rate. If function length contained no information we would expect the true positive rate and the false positive rate to be relatively equal. We can therefore conclude that function length contains statistically significant information in distinguishing between families of malware, and is therefore a useful component for consideration in a classification of malware. Our results also indicate, however, that function length alone is not sufficient.
The function length pattern method correctly identified a higher proportion of the true positives compared with the frequency method. However, the frequency method had a lower false positive rate, giving it a higher overall accuracy. We believe that this is because in our function pattern length method we vary how close a test vector needs to be to the centroid vector depending on the Student t-distribution of the training set. This will broaden the accepted range for a family with a degree of variability. However the broader acceptable range is likely to also accept more false positives.
Adapting the threshold of how closely a test sample fits the signature depending on the variability of the training set adds flexibility and robustness to the classification process. It allows us to accept a broad range of values for features of the family for which there is high variability, while being strict for features of the family that are consistent.
Our approach is efficient to execute and scalable. Our training and classification processes both execute in O(n) time, where n is the number of malware samples. Our feature extraction is highly efficient because we leverage DBMS technology. Our techniques have wider application and could be applied to any kind of feature vector, not just function length information, to produce more robust signatures.
We note that our results are comparable to those of [10] for the family of Trojans.
Our results show that function length information can be used in classifying Trojans, which suggests that, for this type of malware, some elements of program structure remain recognisable throughout the variants within a family. We believe, however, that function length information is unlikely to be an effective input for classifying some other types of malware, such as viruses, where the malicious code is difficult to extract. Without separating the virus code from the host file (a difficult task), the function length information obtained from a virus would be primarily related to the host file program structure rather than the virus itself. To classify viruses, one could use similar statistical techniques as described in this paper combined with different types of information extracted from the executable.
Our technique relies on unpacking. Recent advances [13, 7] in unpacking research provide the tools for generically extracting the executables from samples packed by the most advanced packers.
Conclusion
With an increasing number of malware programs appearing every day, a scalable automated classification system for identifying variants of existing families will be an essential tool for anti-malware researchers. We have demonstrated that function length may play a significant role in such a classification by identifying malware of the Trojan variety. However, our results also show that it is unrealistic to expect function length information on its own to produce perfect accuracy in distinguishing between families.
While applying more advanced pattern recognition techniques may yield a higher accuracy, they are more resource intensive than the methods we have demonstrated here, and so less scalable.The longterm goal then is to find a scaleable method based on features in addition to function length which improve on our current classification method and extend to other malware families. Such features may include string information, imported functions, frequency of opcodes and the original entry point, all of which are available in our Ida2DB database. We expect that an extension to a broad vector of these features will greatly improve the classification accuracy, whilst maintaining the scalability.
